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STRIKING A BALANCE BETWEEN PRIVACY
AND ONLINE COMMERCE
Mark Bartholomew*
It is becoming commonplace to note that privacy and online commerce are on
a collision course. Corporate entities archive and monetize more and more personal
information. Citizens increasingly resent the intrusive nature of such data
collection and use. Just noticing this conflict, however, tells us little. In Informing
and Reforming the Marketplace of Ideas: The Public-Private Model for Data
Production and the First Amendment,1 Professor Shubha Ghosh not only notes the
tension between the costs and benefits of data commercialization, but suggests
three normative perspectives for balancing privacy and commercial speech. This is
valuable because without a rich theoretical framework for assessing the tradeoff
between speech and privacy, important values will be shortchanged by courts
assessing the constitutionality of commercial data regulation. As Professor Ghosh
points out, a judicial response that simply argues for the marketplace to sort all this
out on its own is undertheorized and insufficient.2
By themselves, the three perspectives articulated by Professor Ghosh do not
pinpoint how to balance data commercialization and online privacy. Instead, they
offer a broad view of the policy interests relevant to this balance. Courts deciding
data privacy cases will need to go further, building doctrinal structures that
specifically take these policy interests into account. This does not mean, however,
that courts will need to reinvent the wheel. In this Response, I want to explore an
already existing doctrinal structure for considering rights in information. My
particular focus is the field of intellectual property, which has already wrestled, to
a large degree, with the three perspectives identified by Professor Ghosh.3 Here, I
will identify one intellectual property regime—the right of publicity—and two
particular doctrinal innovations—the “transformativeness” test and the
“newsworthiness” test. These tests are used by courts to determine when an

* © 2013 Mark Bartholomew. Professor of Law, SUNY Buffalo Law School.
1
Shubha Ghosh, Informing and Reforming the Marketplace of Ideas: The
Public-Private Model for Data Production and the First Amendment, 2012 UTAH
L. REV. 653 (2012).
2
See id. at 654–55 (recognizing the “inherent tension between democratic
values of transparency and accountability and the market goal of wealth creation,”
and arguing that “regulation of the marketplace of information is consistent with
freedom of speech”).
3
In his article, Professor Ghosh offers a thorough description of the existing
legal structures for owning data, including intellectual property rights. See id. at
667–91. This Response focuses on a different aspect of intellectual property law:
how courts, once ownership of data has been established, evaluate expressionbased challenges to such ownership.
168

2013]

BALANCE BETWEEN PRIVACY AND ONLINE COMMERCE

169

entity’s First Amendment right to speak should trump a celebrity’s property
interest in her name, likeness, or other information surrounding her persona. The
tests are not perfect, but they may prove useful to future courts struggling to
reconcile new privacy regulations with the expressive interests of commercial
speakers.
According to Professor Ghosh, there are three normative frames for assessing
the First Amendment clash between data commercialization and privacy.4 A
“classic liberal perspective” posits that the market for online speech is controlled
by fully autonomous actors.5 Government actors can effectively use their own
voices to warn consumers of undesirable data collection practices, and consumers
can simply opt out of such practices. Consequently, there is little need for legal
safeguards against data collection and use.6 An “autonomy perspective” is not so
sanguine about market forces.7 More sensitive to intrusions into individual private
space, this perspective seeks to balance a corporation’s right to speak through
others’ personal data with an inherent reservoir of personal protected space.8
Finally, a “fairness perspective” worries about aggregate social balance.9 This
perspective supports laws that preserve the rights of less powerful marketplace
actors, particularly consumers, against those whose ability to communicate
threatens to outstrip other voices.10
Quite rightly in my opinion, Professor Ghosh faults the Supreme Court for its
myopic commitment to the liberal perspective and neglect of the autonomy and
fairness approaches.11 In its 2011 decision, Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,12 the Court
rejected the idea that regulation of the prescribing information held by pharmacies
was needed to prevent pharmaceutical marketers from gaining too great of an
advantage in their efforts to appeal to prescribing physicians.13 Instead, the Court
embraced the liberal perspective, viewing doctors, pharmaceutical marketers, and
consumers as all equally capable of making informed decisions regardless of the
marketers’ ability to use prescribing information to generate individually tailored
commercial appeals.14

4

Id. at 654.
See id. at 705.
6
See id. at 682–83.
7
See id. at 668.
8
See Victor Brudney, The First Amendment and Commercial Speech, 53 B.C.
L. REV. 1153, 1161 (2012) (describing discussion on animating values behind First
Amendment as reflecting, in part, “concern with the autonomy interests of
individual speakers or listeners in their personal or private affairs”).
9
Ghosh, supra note 1, at 668.
10
See id. at 683–84.
11
Id. at 705–06.
12
131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
13
Id. at 2671–72.
14
See id.
5
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Despite Sorrell,15 the liberal perspective does not invariably hold sway when
courts attempt to balance commercial speech rights with other concerns. In fact, in
other situations, courts explicitly consider issues of autonomy and fairness in
calibrating this balance. A great example of this—one that could translate nicely to
resolving the tensions between privacy and free speech—is intellectual property
law. Just as privacy regulation can prevent the speech of others, intellectual
property laws routinely block unauthorized expression. As I describe in a recent
article, different intellectual property regimes address free speech concerns in
different ways.16 These efforts to accommodate the First Amendment reflect
multiple normative perspectives, not just the classic liberal one. In the space
remaining here, I will discuss how just one of these intellectual property regimes,
the right of publicity, addresses free speech through a broader, normative frame
than that found in the Sorrell decision.17
“The right of publicity may be defined as [an individual’s] right to the
exclusive [commercial] use of his or her name or likeness.”18 The right often
conflicts with the expressive rights of others as celebrities have become common
subjects for all kinds of discourse. Recognizing this, courts routinely turn to the
15

The Supreme Court’s Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010),
decision is another example of the liberal approach, blithely assuming that the
marketplace of ideas offers the same opportunities for communication and
persuasion, regardless of the technical and economic advantages of particular
speakers. See id. at 907 (“Factions should be checked by permitting them all to
speak . . . and by entrusting the people to judge what is true and what is false.”).
One scholar notes that the First Amendment “remains almost completely
unconcerned with market failure in the marketplace of ideas and with imbalance
among speakers, their resources, and their persuasive power.” Frederick Schauer,
Facts and the First Amendment, 57 UCLA L. REV. 897, 917 (2010).
16
Mark Bartholomew & John Tehranian, An Intersystemic View of
Intellectual Property and Free Speech, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (2013).
17
As Professor Ghosh and I have discussed, the willingness of courts
adjudicating right of publicity disputes to consider autonomy and fairness concerns
is a relatively recent development. In fact, in the Supreme Court’s only
consideration of the right of publicity, Zacchini v. Scripps Howard Broadcasting
Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977), the Court rejected the defendant broadcaster’s First
Amendment argument, seeming to equate the market for the celebrity performance
at issue with the market for news reporting. Id. at 567–68. In other words, the
Court gave short shrift to interests outside of those of the celebrity rights holder.
See id. Zacchini was a factually unique case, however, involving the rebroadcast of
an individual’s entire human cannonball act, id. at 563–64, and it has had only a
limited impact on subsequent publicity rights decisions. See 2 J. THOMAS
MCCARTHY, THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 8:27 (2d ed. 2009).
18
Toffoloni v. LFP Publ’g Grp., 572 F.3d 1201, 1205 (11th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Martin Luther King, Jr. Ctr. for Soc. Change v. Am. Heritage Prods., 296
S.E. 2d 697, 700 (Ga. 1982)).
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First Amendment in resolving right of publicity disputes.19 These decisions do not
simply assume that the downstream user’s speech rights should triumph. Instead,
judges have introduced two doctrinal mechanisms—the “transformativeness” and
“newsworthiness” tests—to satisfy both free speech interests and the interest in
controlling use of one’s persona.
In assessing a First Amendment defense to a celebrity’s charge of publicity
rights infringement, courts examine the “transformativeness” of the defendant’s
expressive activity. This is an independent and absolute defense to a prima facie
violation of the right of publicity. The standard is a broad one: “[W]hether the
celebrity likeness is one of the ‘raw materials’ from which an original work is
synthesized, or whether the depiction or imitation of the celebrity is the very sum
and substance of the work in question.”20 Essentially, this is “a balancing test
between the First Amendment and the right of publicity.”21
In contrast to the Court’s approach in Sorrell, when applying the
transformativeness test, courts have demonstrated a nuanced recognition of the
tradeoffs between free speech and other social interests. Autonomy concerns are
front and center in these discussions. For example, in evaluating the
“transformativeness” of an unauthorized painting of Tiger Woods, the Sixth
Circuit noted not only the First Amendment’s goal of advancing knowledge
through “a free marketplace of ideas,” but also its “fulfillment of the human need
for self-expression,” an autonomy interest.22 Similarly, when a federal court
recently had to determine the duration of publicity rights under New Jersey
common law, a decision with direct implications for free speech, it noted that “one
of the rationales for recognizing a right of publicity remains its protection of an
individual’s interest in personal dignity and autonomy.”23 The plaintiff was the
purported beneficiary of Albert Einstein’s publicity rights under his will.24 The
defendant, an advertiser that used Einstein’s image without permission, contended
that whatever rights the beneficiary held, they were no longer valid since Einstein
had been dead for over fifty years.25 Ultimately, the court denied the plaintiff’s
request for a right of longer duration, explaining that “the personal interest that is
at stake becomes attenuated after the personality dies.”26 Hence, the court adopted
an autonomy perspective, calibrating the temporal length of the right according to
one’s personal interest in self-fulfillment.

19
20

Bartholomew & Tehranian, supra note 16, at 29–31.
Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 809 (Cal.

2001).
21

Id. at 799.
ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 955 (6th Cir. 2003).
23
Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem v. Gen. Motors, LLC., No. CV10-03790, 2012
WL 4868003, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
24
Id. at *1.
25
Id.
26
Id. at *5.
22
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Courts have also evaluated the free speech-publicity rights balance from a
fairness perspective, assessing the power dynamics of the different speakers and
audiences involved. The Sorrell decision suggested that the only remedy for
problematic speech (like individualized marketing based on pharmacy prescription
data) is more speech, regardless of the costs to patients, prescribing doctors, or the
Vermont health care system.27 The right of publicity’s transformativeness test does
not assume, however, that more speech is a cure-all for any speech with sociallydeleterious consequences. Instead, it asks whether the speaker is actually making a
contribution. If not, the speaker loses First Amendment protection because it is not
actually providing a competing voice. For example, when the Tenth Circuit had to
decide whether right of publicity claims brought by major league baseball players
for the unauthorized use of their names and likenesses on parodic baseball cards
should yield to the First Amendment, it decided whether the cards were
transformative. In doing so, the Tenth Circuit considered the impact of its decision
on the allocation of societal resources. Responding to concerns that unauthorized
uses threatened to cancel out celebrity’s semiotic value, the court distinguished
between “advertising” uses and uses on merchandise like t-shirts, coffee mugs, or
the baseball cards at issue.28 Only after assuring itself that the supply of celebrity
images for public discourse would remain robust, even after the defendant’s uses
were allowed, did the court uphold the defendant’s First Amendment defense.
Relatedly, a “newsworthiness” defense to right of publicity claims also
demonstrates judicial sensitivity to fairness concerns. The defense attempts to
reconfigure the relationship between speech and celebrity privacy, with the press
helping balance out the communicative abilities of celebrities with a countervailing
force. In determining whether the newsworthiness defense is satisfied, a court must
ask whether the defendant’s expression “concerns a matter of public interest” and
is “informative.”29 To a large degree, these questions are proxies for a larger
inquiry into whether the defendant’s use of the celebrity persona represents a
counterpoint to the celebrity voice or merely another request to engage in a
commercial transaction. Hence, the newsworthiness defense has been upheld when
the speech at issue represents some sort of news reporting30 or “editorial
27

See Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2671 (2011) (“Vermont
may be displeased that detailers who use prescriber-identifying information are
effective in promoting brand-name drugs. The State can express that view through
its own speech. But a State’s failure to persuade does not allow it to hamstring the
opposition. The State may not burden the speech of others in order to tilt public
debate in a preferred direction.”).
28
Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959,
974–75 (10th Cir. 1996).
29
Davis v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. 10-03328, 2012 WL 3860819, at *6–7 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 29, 2012) (citing Dora v. Frontline Video, Inc., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790, 792
(Ct. App. 1993)).
30
New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 309–10
(9th Cir. 1992).
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opinion,”31 but it has been disallowed when the defendant was motivated by
commercial rather than journalistic purposes.32
So why did the Court in Sorrell ignore the autonomy and fairness
perspectives? The novelty of the legal issue involved may have caused it to turn to
a more Brandeisian view of the marketplace of ideas where the only permissible
remedy for some kinds of speech is more speech. Or the unique legislative history
of the Vermont statute may have created heightened concern over the contentbased nature of the law. Regardless, additional data privacy legislation is in the
works, and there will surely be First Amendment challenges to its implementation.
In the next go around, a closer look at other bodies of law like the right of publicity
would help the Court realize a richer normative frame like that advocated by
Professor Ghosh and perhaps offer a better doctrinal structure for bridging the
privacy-commercial speech divide.

31

Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1185–86 (9th Cir.

2001).
32

Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 785, 805 (N.D. Cal. 2011).

